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Biometric payment systems are claimed to reduce leakages in
public welfare programmes. Indeed, 230 programmes in more
than 80 countries are currently deploying such systems to
improve security and reduce corruption and fraud. Yet, there is
little evidence for their effectiveness
The Government of India allocates over Rs. 250,000 crores
(US$ 41.6 bn approx.) per year to the social sector (including
subsidies), but the delivery of services is marked by high levels
of leakage and corruption. Weak governance plagues service
delivery across sectors and programmes ranging
from education, health, MNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme), and TPDS (Targeted
Public Distribution System). Yet, governments are often
tempted to focus energies on announcing new programmes and
schemes, rather than on building state capacity for better
implementation of existing programmes. This is partly due to
political incentives: specific programmes can better deliver
patronage to target voter groups, and the returns to investing in
implementation capacity may not be seen within one electoral
cycle.
One notable exception to this pattern has been the
ambitious Aadhaar initiative of the Government of India to
issue biometric unique IDs linked to bank accounts to all
residents. It is hoped that this biometric payments infrastructure
will allow direct benefit transfers (DBT) to intended recipients
and reduce leakage .
Yet there are several reasons to be skeptical about its impact.
First, implementation challenges are non-trivial and the whole
system may fail even if only some components fail, potentially
making the project a ‘white elephant’. Second, the initiative may
be subverted by politically-powerful vested interests whose rents
are threatened. Third, there may be exclusion errors if genuine
beneficiaries are denied payments, leaving the poorest worse
off. Fourth, there may be negative effects on access to
programmes (like MNREGS) if the loss of rents reduces
incentives for officials to implement the programme. Finally,
even assuming positive impacts, the cost-effectiveness of the
system is unknown. Overall, there is very little evidence to
support either the enthusiasts or skeptics of biometric payment
systems.
Evaluating the impact of the AP Smartcard Programme
We aimed to fill this evidence gap by working with the
Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) to evaluate the impact
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Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) to evaluate the impact
of the AP Smartcard Programme, which used biometrically-
authenticated “Smartcards” to make payments to MNREGS
and Social Security Pension (SSP) beneficiaries. The new system
used a network of locally-hired, customer-service providers
(CSPs) to biometrically authenticate beneficiaries and make
cash payments in villages. It thus provided beneficiaries with the
same effective functionality as intended by Aadhaar-linked
DBT.
The key to the scientific credibility of our evaluation was a
landmark MoU with GoAP to randomise the order in which
mandals (block-equivalents) in eight districts of AP would be
covered by the new system over a two-year period. Since
mandals that received the Smartcard programme first (the
treatment group) were chosen by lottery, they were on average
identical to those that received the programme two years later
(the control group). Thus, differences in programme delivery
across treatment and control mandals after two years can be
exclusively attributed to the Smartcard programme. Carried out
in close collaboration with GoAP and covering close to 20
million people, this was one of the largest randomised
controlled trials ever done. We report several findings.
First, our experience confirms that implementing such a
complex project at scale is non-trivial, and will face
considerable technical, administrative, and political challenges.
 Despite exemplary efforts by GoAP to achieve full coverage in
treatment mandals, the share of Smartcard-enabled payments in
those mandals was ~50% after two years. Enrolling
beneficiaries who missed initial enrollment “camps” was a
serious challenge, highlighting the importance of processes for
continuous enrolment .
Yet despite the incomplete implementation, beneficiaries in
“carded” mandals experienced a faster, more reliable, and less
corrupt payment experience. The Smartcard system reduced the
lag between working on an MNREGS project and collecting
payment by 29%, and reduced the unpredictability in the lag by
39%. Further, it reduced by 19% the time workers spent
collecting MNREGS payments.
Smartcards also reduced leakage. MNREGS beneficiaries in
treated mandals reported a 24% increase in weekly earnings,
while fiscal outlays did not change, resulting in a 35%
reduction in leakage (a 10.8 percentage point reduction relative
to the average leakage of 30.8% in the control areas). Similarly,
SSP reported earnings went up by 5%, while official
disbursements did not, leading to a 49% decline in leakage (a
2.9 percentage point reduction relative to average leakage of
6% in the control areas).
We find no evidence that poor or vulnerable segments of the
population were made worse off by the new system. For key
outcomes such as the time to collect payments, payment delays,
and payments received, we find that no treatment household
was worse off relative to a control household at the same
percentile of the outcome distribution. Programme impacts also
did not vary significantly as a function of village-level baseline
characteristics, suggesting broad-based gains across villages
from access to the new payments system.
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These gains for participants who obtained MNREGS work
were not offset by reduced access to MNREGS. We find that
the proportion of households reporting having worked on
MNREGS increased by 18%. We show that this result is
explained by a significant reduction in the fraction of “quasi-
ghost” beneficiaries – defined as cases where officials reported
work against a beneficiary’s name and claimed payment for this
work, but where the beneficiary received neither work nor
payment. These results suggest that the introduction of
biometric authentication made it more difficult for officials to
over-report the amount of work done (and siphon off the extra
wages unknown to the beneficiary), and that the optimal
response for officials was to ensure that more actual work was
done against the claimed wages, with a corresponding increase
in payments made to workers.
We find that improvements in the timeliness of payments are
concentrated entirely in villages that switched to the new
payment system, but do not vary across recipients who had or
had not received biometric Smartcards within these villages. In
contrast, increases in payments to beneficiaries and reductions
in leakage are found only among recipients who received
biometric Smartcards. This suggests that organisational changes
associated with the new payment system (especially moving the
point of payment to the village) drove improvements in the
payments process, while biometric authentication was the key
to reducing fraud.
Overall, the data suggest that Smartcards improved beneficiary
experiences in collecting payments, increased payments received
by programme participants, reduced corruption, broadened
access to programme benefits, and achieved these without
substantially altering fiscal burdens on the state. Consistent
with these results, we find that 90% of MNREGS beneficiaries
and 93% of SSP recipients who were exposed to the Smartcard
initiative reported that they prefer the new system to the old.
Finally, we find that Smartcards were very cost-effective. The
monetised value of time savings to beneficiaries (Rs. 26 crores
or US$ 4.3 mn approx.) alone was greater than the cost of the
new system (Rs. 24 crores or US$ 4 mn approx.) for MNREGS.
The reduction in MNREGS leakage (of Rs. 197 crores or US$
32.8 mn approx.) was eight times the cost of the programme.
SSP leakage was reduced by Rs. 20 crores (US$ 3.3 mn approx.)
(relative to implementation costs of Rs. 14 crores or US$ 2.3
mn approx.). All estimates are only for the eight study districts,
and would be higher if extended to all of AP.
What are the lessons of this smartcard project?
What can we learn from the Smartcards experience about the
potential for Aadhaar-linked DBTs in other states and
programmes? As always, one has to be careful in extrapolating
from one state and two programmes, but our experiences
working with GoAP suggest five broad lessons, and one caveat:
1. It is important to not expect miracles overnight. While 50%
coverage in two years may seem modest, even the United States
took 15 years to migrate Social Security payments from paper
checks to electronic transfers. Our results show that large gains
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checks to electronic transfers. Our results show that large gains
in programme performance are possible even with 50%
implementation, and that the investment in biometric payments
can pay off in as little as two years. So, implementation
challenges should be expected and addressed, but should not be
used as an excuse for inaction.
2.  Adopting biometric authentication need not exclude vulnerable
beneficiaries.  This is an important finding since such exclusion
errors are a legitimate concern among opponents of biometric
payments, yet we find no evidence of any such adverse effects.
We believe this is at least partly because GoAP did not make
Smartcards mandatoryfor collecting payment. Thus, while those
who enrolled benefited from lower leakage, those who did not
(or were not able to) were not excluded. While not mandating
Smartcards certainly may have left open some avenues for
corruption, it may also have been a politically astute choice that
helped prevent exclusion errors and maintain broad-based
beneficiary support. This lesson is especially pertinent given the
Supreme Court’s ruling that Aadhaar cannot be mandatory for
programme participation. Our experiences suggest an approach
that focuses on making Aadhaar-enabled payments more
convenient to beneficiaries, but not mandatory, may be the most
pragmatic one anyway.
3.  There will inevitably be push back from vested interests whose
rents are reduced.  Senior officials in GoAP were much more
likely to hear field reports about problems with Smartcards than
about positive results. This bias was so severe that GoAP
considered scrapping the Smartcard system in 2013, and their
decision to not do so was partly in response to reviewing our
data on beneficiary preferences. The episode provides an
excellent example of the political economy of concentrated costs
(to low-level officials who lost rents due to Smartcards, and were
vocal with negative feedback) versus diffuse benefits (to millions
of beneficiaries, who were less likely to communicate positive
feedback), and highlights the importance of avoiding
policymaking by anecdote, and instead relying on representative
data from larger samples.
4.  Given implementation complexities, it would make sense to
focus on saturating Aadhaarcoverage in a few districts (a few per
state) and mastering implementation details of integrating
programmes with Aadhaar before trying to scale up too fast. A
related lesson is to encourage multiplicity of vendors. An
important implementation lesson from AP was the use of a “one-
district one-bank” model, whereby different banks implemented
the Smartcard project in different districts. While this increased
coordination costs, it allowed GoAP to evaluate vendor
performance in the field and re-allocate districts from non-
performing banks to high-performing banks and technology-
service providers (TSPs). This was critical in preventing GoAP
from being held hostage by a non-performing vendor, and also
provided incentives to better-performing banks.
5.  It is essential to align the incentives of key partners – banks and
TSPs – to provide the essential last-mile financial inclusion
services. A “stick” based approach of providing banks with
account-opening targets under pain of regulatory penalties is
likely to result in large numbers of dormant accounts. On the
other hand, paying banks commissions on payments made
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other hand, paying banks commissions on payments made
(GoAP paid 2%) creates the right incentives for not just opening
accounts but keeping them active. Overall, there are strong
synergies between the government’s focus on financial inclusion
and DBT, since the commissions on DBT payments can cover the
fixed costs of setting up and maintaining last-mile financial
inclusion architecture.
The one policy caveat is that our results focus on
the economic costs and benefits of biometric payments, and do
not speak to concerns regarding privacy and unauthorised use
of Aadhaar-linked data. It would therefore be prudent for the
government to make sure that expansion of Aadhaar-linked
service delivery is accompanied by enabling legislation with
adequate data-use safeguards, and parliamentary approval.
A game changer for governance
Overall, our comprehensive study of the AP Smartcard project
finds substantial economic benefits to taxpayers and
programme beneficiaries from biometrically-authenticated
payments, and the results suggest that Aadhaar-enabled DBTs
can indeed be a game changer for governance in India. Senior
leaders of the new government have expressed strong support
for following through on this promise and implementation
should now be a top priority.
Notes:
1. Note that India is not alone in its enthusiasm. The potential for
biometric payment systems to improve the performance of public
welfare programmes (and also provide financial inclusion for the
poor) has generated enormous interest around the world. A
recent survey article has documented the existence of 230
programmes in over 80 countries that are deploying biometric
identification and payment systems.
2. See our companion implementation report for further lessons
regarding effective implementation of a biometrics payment
system.
